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Abstract 
There is a formal equivalence between games, societies, and economies. 
Lindahl equilibrium for a game or society corresponds to competitive 
equilibrium for the equivalent economy. Results on existence and opti- 
mality of competitive equilibrium thus apply to the theory of games and 
societies. The "core" for a game or society as derived by extension from the 
core of an economy is "too large" to be interesting. An example illustrates 
that the a-core may be disjoint from the set of Lindahl equilibria. However, 
if the power of coalitions to inflict negative externalities is suitably restricted, 
Lindahl equilibria must be in the a-coreo 
I. Introduction 
The fagt that an economy with public goods may be treated as a private 
goods economy in a commodity space of higher dimension was noted by 
Arrow (1969) and later exploited by others, including Starrett (1973), 
Rader (1972) and Bergstrom (1976). Here we develop this notion sys- 
tematically by demonstrating the equivalence of the notions of game, 
society, and economy. This enables us to define Lindahl ecLuilibrium for a 
game or society in such a way as to correspond to competitive equilibrium 
for the equivalent economy. In view of this equivalence, theorems on the 
existence of Lindahl equilibrium become straightforward corollaries of 
theorems on the existence of competitive equilibria for the corresponding 
economies. We show that the notion of a core for a game or society derived 
by extension from the core of the equivalent economy is relatively 
uninteresting since it is "too large." We then study the a-core of Scarf 
(1971) for a game or society. We show by example that the a-core and the 
set of  Lindaht equilibria may be disjoint. This extends and sharpens the 
observation of Shapley and Shubik (1969) and Bergstrom (1975) that some 
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Lindahl equilibria are not  in the a-core.  We also extend results of  Shapley 
and Shubik (1969), Starrett (1973) and Bergstrom (1976), by demonstrat- 
ing that the Lindahl equilibrium is in the core when the power of  coali- 
tions to impose negative externalities from equilibrium is removed. 
II. Models of social interaction 
We discuss three alternative models of  social interaction. These are a game, 
a society,  and an economy .  The notions of  game and economy are familiar. 
Our discussion motivates the notion of  a society. It will be shown that all 
three concepts are related by isomorphism. 
Defini t ion 1. Where L g is a linear space, an n person game ( Y I  . . . .  , Yn,  
Rg~ . . . . .  Rgn) on L g is characterized by the following sets: 
1. For i = 1 . . . . .  n, the strategy set of  Agent i is Yi C L g where 0 e Yi .1 
n 
2. The ou tcome  set is Y = X Yi  .2 
i = 1  
3. For i = 1 , . . . ,  n, the preference relation of  Agent i on outcomes  is 
R ~ C Y X  Y. 
Defini t ion 2. Where L s is a linear space, an n person society ( X ~ , . . .  , X  n, 
R s , R s n)  on L s is characterized by the following sets: 
1 , • . o  
' 1. For i = 1 . . . .  , n, the action set of  Agent i is X i C L s where 0 e Xi .  3 
n 
2. The set o f  social states is X = Z X i.4 
i = 1  
3. For i = 1 . . . .  , n, the preference relation of  Agent i on social states is 
R ~ C X X X  
(Literally, a society is the sum of its parts.) 
An example of  a society is the following. Imagine a village with n citizens 
each of  whom pursues the sole activity of  driving an automobile through the 
village streets. Although each citizen loves to drive, they all abhor the con- 
gestion and pollution due to traffic. Assume that each citizen does not care 
which of  his fellow citizens are driving, so long as the total amount of  
driving by others is fixed. For each i, suppose that any possible amount 
of  driving by i can be represented by a number in the closed real interval 
[0, ai] . 
To model our. village as a society we represent the action of  a citizen i 
who drives z~ hours by an n + 1 vector xx with an entry of  zl in the ith 
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coordinate and in the n + 1 coordinate with zeroes elsewhere. Then define 
the action set of i a s X / =  ( ( 0 , . . .  ,O, zi, O , . . .  ,O,zi)  e R  n + 2 0<= z/<__ai). 
Then for any social state xeY.X/ ,  the ith component  reports the amount 
of  driving by i while the n + 1 component  reports the total amount of  
driving summed over all citizens. Thus preference levels are fully specified 
by the choice of  a point in X = Z X  i. In fact, the preference relation R~ will 
in this example have the property that R~ ~ ((y, z) eX X X [ y~ ~- z i, 
Yn + 1 <-zn+ 1 }" 
Alternatively village affairs could be modelled as a game in which for each 
~/ 
t I 
i, Yi = [O,a/] ,  Y =  X Y/ and where (yl . . . . .  Y n ) R ~ ( Y l  . . . .  , Y n ) i f a n d  
i = l  
n n 
~ ! 
only if(y/,  x )R~  (y/, x ')  wherex  = E y.., a n d x '  = ~ y/ .  It is easily seen 
j = l  ~ j 1 
~ that this procedure can be generalized as follows. 
Remark 1. There is a one to one mapping from the set o f n  person societies 
on a linear space L s in to(but  not on to) the  set o f n  person games on L g =L s 
such that the society ( X ~ , . . . ,  Xn, RS~ . . . . .  RSn) is identified with the 
game (Y1 . . . .  , Yn, Rg~ . . . .  Rg n ) where: 
1. Yi= X / 
n n 
2. Y= × Y / =  × x / .  
i = 1  i = 1  
3. R~ = ((y~ . . . .  ,Yn),(Y'~ . . . .  ,Y'n) eY× Y 1 ~'YiR~ ~Y'~ }" 
Slightly less obvious is the fact that with an appropriate expansion of  the 
dimension of  the space in which it is embedded, a game can be regarded as 
a society. This is formalized below. 
Remark 2. There is a one to one mapping from the set o f  n person games 
on a linear space Z g into the set o f  n person societies o n  (Lg)  n (the n-fold 
Cartesian product of  Lg), such that the game (Y1, g . . . .  Yn, R1 . . . .  ,ngn) is 
identified with the society (X~ . . . .  , X n, RS~ , . . . , RSn ) where: 
1. x i : ( ( o , . . . ,  x , . , . . . ,  0) e (~:~)n [ x; e r~ 1. 
n n 
2. X :  Z X~.:  × Y i = Y  
i = l  i = l  
3. ~ = R~ 
Rather surprisingly, it happens that the concept of  an economy is at least as 
ic choice 
general as that  of  a game or a society. Our definition of  an economy is 
similar to that o f  Debreu (1959). However we attach production possibility 
sets directly to individuals rather than to firms whose ownership is parti- 
tioned among individuals. Where production possibility sets are convex, 
these two approaches are equivalent, as has been observed by Rader (1972) 
and Nikaido (1968). The procedure used here leads to a less cumbersome 
treatment of  game theoretic notions. 
Defini t ion 3. Where L e is a linear space, an n person economy  (C1 . . . .  , C n, 
T~ . . . . .  T n, R t , • • . ,  R n) on L e is characterized by the following sets: 
1. For i = 1, . . . ,  n, the consumpt ion set of  Agent i is C i C L e and the 
product ion possibility set of  Agent i is T i C L e. 
n n 
2. The set of  feasible allocations is Z = x C i f l  {(Zl . . . .  , Zn) I ~ 
i = 1  i = 1  
zi ~ X Ti ). 
3. For i = 1 . . . .  , n, the preference relation of A g e n t / i s  R~ c C/X C/. 
Condition (3) deserves further explanation. The total consumption of the 
economy is ~; z i. According to conditon (3), the total consumption must 
be equal to the sum of  some production in the economy. In effect, 
exchange of  commodities entails no cost. 
It turns out that every society and every game is "equivalent to"  an 
economy. This is the basic result o f  Rader (1973) and is stated formally as 
remarks 3 and 4. We also examine the somewhat tangential but very interest- 
ing question of  when an economy is equivalent to a society or game. Re- 
marks 5 and 6 contains an answer to this question. Verification of each of 
these remarks is straightforward. 
R e m a r k  3. There exists a one to one mapping from the set of  n person 
societies on L s into the set o f  n person economies on (LS) n such that the 
society (Xx . . . . .  Xn,  R~ . . . . .  RS n)  is identified with the economy 
( C , , . . . ,  C n, T,  . . . .  , Tn,Re~ . . . . .  Ren) where: 
1. C i = {(xl . . . . .  Xn) e ( Z X i )  n [ x ] = O f o r ] 4 = i }  
h = ~(~, . . . . .  x , , )  ~ (x~ ) -  ],~x = x ~  = . . .  =x , ,  1. 
n 
2. z = x c~r~ {(~, . . . . .  ~ . )  [ x ~ . } .  
i = 1  
= {(Z1 . . . .  , Zn) [ for some x e ~ X  1 and all i = 1 , . . . ,  n, z i 
= (o  . . . . .  x . . . . .  o )  ~ c~} .  
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f t 
3. R;. = ; ( x ,  . . . . .  ~ , ) , (~ '~  . . . . .  x , ) e C ~ x C i  I(x,~)~RI}. 
Remark  4. There exists a one to one mapping from the set o f  n person 
games on L g into the set of n person economies on (Lg) n~ such that the 
game (Y I  . . . . .  Yn,  Ra . . . . .  R n )  is identified with the economy 
(C~ . . . . .  Cn, T~ . . . .  , T n , R  a . . . . .  R n )  where: 
1. C i = ( ( z l  . . . .  , z n )  e ( Y )  n [ z j = O f o r / ~ a i a n d z i e Y  }. 
V i = { ( za , . . . ,Zn )e (Y)n  I fo r someYieY i , z i = ( O  . . . . .  Yi . . . .  , O ) e Y  
for ally = 1 . . . .  , n  ). 
/I // H 
Z l Z i e  t Ti)= {(za . . . . .  zn)  2. Z = x C i f q { ( z ~ , . . . , Z n )  e ( Y ) n  l i  = "~=l 
i = 1  
e ( Y )  n [ f o r s o m e y e Y ,  z i = y f o r a l l i  = l , . . . , n ) .  
f f 
3. R 7 = f f ( z~  . . . . .  z , ) , ( z ' , , . . .  ,z,))eqX q ](zi, ~) eR~ ). 
The obvious way to "make an economy into a society" is to allow individ- 
uals to "allocate" their production among the agents. Thus for each i we 
~ z .  might make X i = {(zia . . . . .  z] , )  I ] i i  eT i  ) where zi j is  the amount of i ' s  
production allocated to ]. For x e Z X i ,  the ]th component X i o f X  would 
represent the total vector of production allocated to ]. Thus it would be 
natural to assign preferences R,  s. so that x R ~ x '  if and only ifx~R~.x~. The 
only snag here is that for this procedure to work smoothly we must ensure 
that x i and x~ belong to the consumption set C~. This we achieve by allow- 
ing only non-negative transfers and by assuming that each C~ is the non- 
negative orthant of L e so that no individual can be "forced out of  his 
consumption set" by admissable transfers from others. Remarks 5 and 6 
explicate the situation formally. 
R e m a r k  5. Let L~_ be the non-negative orthant of  an ordered linear space. 
There is a one to one mapping from the set of  n person economies on L e 
for which C i = Le+ for i = 1 , . . . ,  n into the set of  societies on (Le)  n such 
that the economy (C1 . . . . .  Cn, T1, . . . , T n, Re~, . . ,  Ren) is identified 
with the society (Xx, • • •, X n , RS~, ~ . . ,  RSn ) where: 
1. X i = (zie(Le+) n [ z i = ( z i l  . . . .  ,zin) and 
11 
2. x = z x i  
i = 1  
3. R i ( ( x , x ' )  e X X X  [ , e s = (xi, x i ) e R i  }. 
n 
~ zu~l '  ~ }. 
/ = 1  
~ blic choice 
Remark 6. Let L e+. be the non-negative orthant o f  an ordered linear space. 
There is a one to one m.apping from the set o f  n person economies on L e 
for which Ci = L~ for i = 1 . . . . .  n into the set o f  games on (Le)  n such 
that the economy (CI , . . . ,  Cn, T1, . . . ,  Tn, R e l , . . . ,  R en) is identified 
with the game (Y ,  . . . . .  Yn, R~I, " " " ' Rgn) where: 
n 
= ¢g (L ean Zin)and Z=lZileTi),  1. Yi t i6~ +) 1 Z i = ( Z i l  ' ' ' ' '  / 
n 
2. Y = × Yi 
i = 1  n 
, ~ lZi, 3. R~ = ((zl  . . . . .  Zn), ( Z l , . . . ,  z' n) e (Le) n × (Le) n ] ( i = 
n ! $ 
~ z i )eR  i ). 
i = 1  
III. Competitive equilibrium and Lindahl equilibrium. 
The equivalence of economies, games, and societies enables us to extend 
results in competitive theory to the theory of  games and societies. 
Definition 4. A competitive equilibrium for the economy ( C ~ , . . . ,  C n, 
T x , . . . ,  T n, R e ~ , . . . , R e n )  on L e consists of  points (~-1 . . . .  , Yn) e 
n 
× C i and~e(Le)  * (where (Le) * is the dual space o f (Le ) )  such that: 
i = 1  
1. For each i, ~-i maximizes R [ on the budget set (x ieC i 1, fix i < max. ffz ). 
zeT~ 
n n 
2. ~ Y i e t ~ l T  i. i = 1  "= 
Definition 5. ALindahl equilibrium fo ra  society (X1, i . .  , X  n, RS~ . . . .  RSn) 
on L s consists of  points ~ieXi  and ~i e (LS) * (the dual space of L s) for 
each / such  that ~- = ] ~i  optimizes R7 on ( x e X  1~ i x < m a x .  ~x i ). 
x i6X  i 
Definition 6. A Lindahl equilibrium for a game ( YI . . . .  , Yn, R1 . . . .  , R n) 
on L g consists of  points f i ieYig(fi] . . . .  ~n)e((Lg)n)  * (the dual space of  
the n-fold Cartesian product of  L g) such that for each i, fi  = (fia . . . . .  f n )  
n n 
maximizesR~ on ((y~ . . . . .  Yn) e Y [ ] ~ 1  j= 
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In Lindahl equilibrium for either a society or a game, each individual has 
his own price vector used to evaluate the final social state. His "budget 
set" consists of  those social states whose "cost" at his own prices does not 
exceed the value of his own activity valued at the sum of the prices of all 
agents. 
Remark  7. If a society or a game is equivalent to an economy as in remark 
3 or remark 4, then a competitive equilibrium for the economy is a Lindahl 
equilibrium for the game or society. 
Remark 7 can be verified as a direct consequence of the definitions. An 
immediate consequence of remark 7 is: 
Remark  ,8. If a society or game is equivalent to an economy for which com- 
petitive equilibrium exists, then there exists a Lindahl equilibrium for the 
society or game. 
We can extend the fundamental results on the relation between Pareto 
optima and competitive equilibria for economies to that between Pareto 
optima and Lindahl equilibria for games and sdcieties. By direct application 
of the technique used to prove the optimality of competitive equilibrium we 
have: 
Remark  9. If preferences of all agents are locally non-satiated, a Lindahl 
equilibrium for a game or a society is Pareto optimal. 
It is easy to show that a Pareto optimal outcome or social state for a game 
or a society corresponds to a Pareto optimum for the equivalent economy. 
If the "second theorem of welfare economics" applies to the equivalent 
economy, then this Pareto optimum for the economy is a competitive 
equilibrium given an appropriate distribution of wealth. It is easy to show as 
a consequence of Remark 7 that the original Pareto optimum for the game 
or social state is also a Lindahl equilibrium for a game or social state obtained 
by a transformation of the origin of the original game or social state. This 
result is made explicit as: 
Remark  10. I f  a game or society is equivalent to an economy for which the 
"second theorem of welfare economics" applies, then any Pareto optimal 
outcome or social state for the game or society is a Lindahl equilibrium out- 
come or social state for the game or society obtained by translating the 
coordinates of the original game or society so that the specified Pareto opti- 
mum becomes the origin. 
Since the equivalence mappings of Remarks 3 and 4 preserve convexity 
and closedness of sets in a linear topological space, the equivalent economy 
will inherit properties of convexity and continuity assumed for a game or. 
society. Therefore in a game or a society, we assume continuity and convexity 
of preferences and closedness and convexity of  strategy sets or actions sets, 
c choice 
along with certain technical assumptions to deal with "boundary problems", 
then we can be assured that in the equivalent economy, competitive equilib- 
rium will exist and the second theorem of welfare economics will hold. Thus 
the applicability of remarks 9 and 10 is established. These matters are 
treated in Rader (1973) and in more detail in Bergstrom (1976). 
IV. The "core" in economies, games, and societies 
A. The "core"as extended from an equivalent economy 
A well known result of Shapley (in Rader, 1972, or Nikaido, 1968) is that 
every competitive equilibrium belongs to the core of an economy. If  the 
core of a game or society were defined to consist of those outcomes or 
social situations that correspond under the mappings of Remarks 3 and 4 to 
points in the core of the equivalent economy, then the Lindahl equilibria 
which according to Remarks 7 and 8 correspond to the competitive equilibria 
would belong to the core. This procedure, however, leads to a core which 
is too large to be of  interest. Indeed it turns out that the core would then 
contain all Pareto optima which are Pareto superior to the outcome in 
which all agents undertake the zero strategy. This result is stated formally 
as Remark 11 for the case of a society. A similar remark applies to games. 
Definition 7. Let (C1, • • . ,  C n, T1 . . . . .  T n, R I , . . .  ,Rn)  be an economy. 
Where K c { 1 . . . . .  n ), coalition K is said to be able to improve on an allo- 
n /q 
cation ( X l , . . . ,  x n) e x Ci if there exists (x'~,. . . ,x'n) e × C i such 
i = 1  i = 1  
that ] Ze KX } e ] e K ~ T.j and x~j R.I x i for all ] e K while x i Pi xi  for some ieK. 
The core of the economy is the set of allocations which are feasible and 
which can be improved on by no coalition K C ( 1 . . . .  , n ).  
Remark 11. I f  a Society S is equivalent to an economy E, then the set of 
social states in S which correspond to allocations in the core of E is the set 
of Pareto optimal social states xeS such that xR~ 0 for all ie/. 
The proof of Remark i 1 is straightforward once it is observed from the 
construction of the sets C i and Ti in the equivalent economy that for any 
coalition K C ( i  . . ,  n }, ~ C. (3 Z Tj = 0. Thus coalitions other than 
# '" j e K  I [ e K  
( 1 . . . . .  n )  are unable to improve on the situation in which each agent 
undertakes the zero activity. 
B. The a-core 
In view of Remark 11, we must look elsewhere for an interesting notion of 
the "core" of a game or society. One such alternative, the a-core, is due to 
Scarf(1971). In order to improve on allocation in the sense of the a core, 
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a coalition must be able to assign alternative strategies to its members in 
such a way that regardless of  the responses in the complementary coalition, 
no member  o f  the coalition is made worse off  and at least one member  
benefits. This is formalized as follows. 
Definition 8. Let ( Y I , . .  . ,  Yn, Rgx, "'o ,Rgn) be an n person game. Coali- 
tion K C (1 . . . . .  n ) i s  able to improve (in the sense of  the a-core)  on the 
outcome (Ya . . . . .  y , )  e Y if there exists .~ e Y; for e a c h / e K  such that for 
! ( ~  t "~ V t ~ ~ . /  t . 
a l l y e Y  ~(Yl . . . . .  Yn)  l Y i = Y i f ° r a l l l e K } , y R i y f o r a l l l  eKand 
~ p .  . . 
y i~v for some teK. The .a -core  is tile set o f  outcomes in Y on which no 
coalition K C  ~ 1 . . . . .  n } can improve. 
Definition 9. Let (X1, . . . .  X n, RS~ , . . . ,  RSn) be an n person society. 
~/  
Coalition K C  { 1 , . . . ,  n ) is able to improve on (xa, • • •, Xn)e" × X i if 
z = l  
there exists ~jeXj for each ]eK such that for all x 'eE Xi, ~ Yc. +x' 
]~K jeK ! 
n 
R~ .~ x / f o r  all ieK with strict preference for some ieK. The a-core is 
1 = 1  
the set o f  social states on which no coalition can improve. 
Scarf shows that where Y is convex and compact and where each R~ repre- 
sents continuous, convex preferences the a core is non empty.  In view of  
remark 1 and Scarf's result we can assert: 
Remark 12. In a society where for all ieL X i is convex and compact and R ~ 
represents continuous, convex preferences, the a core is non-empty.  
The a core, however, has at least two features which are undesirable for 
our purposes. Let the game be one in which many  agents are able to inflict 
severe damages on others. Then the conservative nature of  the blocking 
criterion is such that the a core turns out to be httle less than the set of  
Pareto optimal social states. In fact the a core may even include social 
states which are worse for some agents than the initial state OeX. Also, 
where there are asymmetries in the possibilities for agents to damage others, 
the a core may exclude the Lindahl equilibrium social states. The dif- 
ficulties are illustrated in the following example. 
Example 1 
This example can be thought o f  as a two person game in which each partici- 
pant performs.an activity which he enjoys but which distresses the other. 
Formally, let Y1 and Y~ be the closed real intervals [0, a] and [0, b ] .  
Preferences of  Agents 1 and 2 are represented by the utility functions, 
1 2 
u 1 (y i, Y2) = Yl - ~ y 2 and u ~ (y 1, Y~) = Y2 - 21- Y ~. It is not hard to show 
ic choice 
that the set of  Pareto optimal outcomes is: {(y~, y 2 ) l Y l "  Y :  = 1, 
0<=yt <= a, 0<=y: <= b } U  ( ( a , y ~ )  <=1 }u {(yt ,  b) 10<--yt 
a 
To find the a-core, we observe that the highest utility which Agent 1 can 
1 b~ while the best that Agent 2 can guarantee himself is u~(a,  b)  = a - -~ 
is b - 91-a ~ . Thus the a-core consists of those Pareto opti- guarantee hipaself 
1 b2 and u : ( y l , y 2 )  mal outcomes (y~, y2)  such that u~(y~, y~)  => a - ~ 
1 ~ => b - ~-a . These limits will both be negative for appropriate choices of  a 
and b. (For example, let a = b > 2). Thus the s-core can contain outcomes 
which each agent regards as interior to the "initial state" (0, 0). It is also 
clear that the a-core can be made arbitrarily large by choice of sufficiently 
large values of_a and b. 
Where a _2 1 and b ~  1 ,there is a Lindahl equilibrium in which the Lindahl 
prices are pl  = (1 ,-  1) andp ~ = (-  1,1) and the strategies are y~ = y :  = 1. To 





u~(y,,y~)=- -~ = d(3, ~) 
• ocos OF 
PARETO ~ /  ~ / 
EFFICIENT ~ - -  ," ~- 
POINTS ~ / / ~ 
- ~ A / ~ /  / / ~  ~ / / 
/ /  ~ a-CORE / /  ~ ~ ~ / / / 
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Y2) subject to the constraint 1 • y l  + ( -1)y2 = < yle[O,a]max [Pll +p~]2 Yl = 
max [1 + (-1)]  Ya = 0 and that likewise (1, l )  maximizes u ~ ( y l , y ~ )  
y~ e [0, a] 
m a x  1 2 
subject to the constraint (- 1 ) -y l÷ l ' y2  =< y~ e [0, b] [p2 + p~ ] y~ = 0. It can 
also be shown that this Lindahl equilibrium is unique. 
Figure 1 illustrates this discussion for the case where a = b = 3. The dashed 
lines are indifference curves as labelled. The heavy line is the locus of  Pareto 
efficient points, the segment AB is the t~-core and the segment CD is the set 
Pareto efficient points which are preferred by both agents to the outcome 
(0, 0). The point E is the only Lindahl equilibrium outcome.  
To show that the set of  Lindahl equilibria and the ~-core may be disjoint, 
consider the case where a = 3 and b = 2. According to our previous discus- 
sion, the only Lindahl equilibrium outcome is ( y l ,  y z )  = (1, 1). For any 
outcome in the t~-core, u a ( y x , y ~ )  >= u ~ (a, b) = u a (3 ,2 )  = 1. But u a (1, 1) 
1 
= - .  Thus the (unique) Lindahl equilibrium is not in the s -core  and we have 
2 
the promised example. Figure 2 illustrates this case. The Lindahl equilib- 
rium is the point E and the ~-core is the segment AB. 
Y2 
uZ(Y,, Y2)=½ U'(Yl, Y2) = ½ \ / 
\ LOCUS OF "~,,/ / ~ / "  " _/-~ 
\ PARETO / / / /  / ~  I 
~ EFFICIENT / / / /  / /  / 
~ P O I N T S  / / / /  / /  / 
k~ / / /  / / 
/ / . -  / ,, , ,  / 
~ / ~ /  / ~ u  tYl, YZ/=' 1 
~ ./~" / / 
LINDAHL ~ ,~" / z - / 
E Q U I L I B R I U M ~  / /  u (y~,y~)=~ / 
- -  / / 
Z 
/ / , / 




C. The core when damage is limited by law or technology 
We now consider a fairly strong core property that Lindahl equilibrium does 
have. While this discussion concerns societies, parallel results for games can 
be obtained as a straightforward application of Remark 1. 
For an n person society, Lindahl prices ~- = (i61 . . . . .  i6 n) can be used to 
compute "values" of the actions of one coalition to another. 
Definition 10. Where the actions of the agents are xl  . . . .  ,Xn, the benefit 
value of the actions of coalition S to the complementary coalition, -S ,  is 
defined as: 
£ - i , -  £ " 
~S ( F , x ~ , . . .  , x , , ) = ( i e _ S P  ) t i e S X i ) .  
It turns out that in Lindahl equilibrium, for every coalition S the benefit 
value of the actions of S to ~S equals the benefit value of the actions of 
~S to S. Furthermore if another social situation improves on Lindahl 
equilibrium for some coalition S, then in the proposed social situation the 
benefit value of the actions of ~S to S exceeds the benefit value of actions 
of S to ~S. This suggests that Lindahl equilibrium is really a social exchange 
equilibrium. These results are stated formally in the next remark. 
Remarkl3. Let ( Z ~ , . . . ,  Xn, p . . . .  , ~n) constitute a Lindaht equilibrium 
for the society ( X 1 , . . . ,  X n, R ~ , . . . ,  Rn). If preferences of all agents are 
locally non-satiated, then: 
1. F o r a l l S C  ~1,. . . ,n ) ,~s ( f f ,  Xl . . . .  ,Yn)=f l -S(f f ,~- l ,  " ' ' , ~ - n )  
n 
2. F o r a l l S C  ( 1 , . . . . , n ) , i f ( x l , . . . , x n ) e  x Xjandif :  
/ '=1 
n n 
Z xj R/s E E. for all ieS with strict preference for some ieS, then 
j = ~  j = ~  ~ 
~ - , s ( P ,  x ,  , . . . , x n )  > ~s(F, x ~ , . . .  ,x ,) .  
Proof." 
Let (/51 . . . .  , fin, ~-~ . . . . .  ~-n ) be a Lindahl equilibrium and S C { 1 . . . . .  n ). 
If preferences are locally non-satiated for all ieS it follows that 
n n 
i 6i ~ ~-i = ( Z li6/)~ifor all ieS. Summing these equations we have 
y = l  1 =  
G -i n n ~S G -  ~ - = (i ~ /~i) (i__ ~i)" Subtracting (iceS fii) (iesX,) from ( iesP ) ]= 1 xj , =  1 
each side we have (i~eS ffi) ~ E ~ -i ~ :~i) which establishes (ie ~S i) = (ie ~S p ) (ieS 
(1). 
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I f (x~  . . . . .  x n ) e  × X jand  ~ x lR / s  ~1~-1 for all ieS with strict 
j = l  j = l  j=  
n n 
preferences for some ieS, then for all ieS, ~ ~ xy >- ( ~ ~J~i  with 
j = l  / = 1  
~ ~ 
z z x . ) > (  ~ ~)  strict inequflity for some ieS. Therefore ( ieS fii) (1 = 1 ~ ] = 1 
~ ~ - i  ~ ( iesXi) .  Subtracting ( ieS p ) ( ieSXi)  from each side of  the inequ~ity we 
~ -i ~ ~ ~ -i, ~ ~ xi). This establishes (2). Q.E.D. have ( ieS  p ) ( i e , sX i )  > ~ie ~S p ) ~ieS 
~ e r e  ~ is a system of Lind~l  prices, we define the set of  ~-admis~ble 
actions for a coalition S to be those possible actions of co~ition S which 
have non-negative benefit value for "S. 
Definition 11. Let ff = ( f f l ,  . . . , f i n )  be a system of Lindahl prices for the 
society (Xa . . . . .  X n, R ~ . . . .  , Rn). The set of  ~-admissable strategies for 
S C  ~1 . . . . .  n ) i S ~ i e S X i e i e s X i  l ( i  ~ i ) (  i xi) > 0 ) .  
We now state the promised core property of  Lindahl equilibrium. 
Remark 14. If preferences of  all agents are locally non-satiated, a Lindahl 
equilibrium (if, ~ - l , - . .  ,~-n) has the property that no coalition S C 
{1 . . . . .  n } can improve on (~-i . . . .  , ~-n) by means of a strategy which is 
~--admissable for S. 
/'roof." 
~ ~ x t If  coalition S can improve on (~a . . . .  , ~n), then there is some x s = ieS i 
~ X  ' ~ X  ' ' e ieS i such that f°r all x~s  e ie S i' and f°r all j e S, (x/, xs  + ' x ~s ) R/ 
~- -~  
(~-J' ieS x/)with strict preference from some jeS.  From Remark 15 it then 
follows that ( Z -i~ ~ , E - i  ~ , ieS p ) (ie - sX i  ) > ( i e ' S  p ) (ieSXi)" Since, by construction, 
0 - X~ for a.~ i, this ~equ~i ty  must hold when x~ = 0 for ~1 i e "S. There- 
~ , f • , fore ( i f ' S  fii) ( i esXl )  < O. But t~s  means that .the choice o strategies x i
for members of S is not ~-admissable for S. Q.E.D. 
We conclude by observ~g some e x ~ p l e s  of restrictions on strategies 
which if ~ p o s e d  either by technology or by law will restra~ all co~itions 
to ~-admissable strategies where ~ is any system of L i n d ~  prices. 
ublic choice 
R e s t r i c t i o n  1 
For all agents, X i is the non-negative orthant of  Euclidean n-space and 
preferences are monotone non-decreasing in each component. Then any 
Lindahl price system ff must be non-negative and hence all feasible strat6gies 
must be ~-admissable. This is the case o f  external economies discussed by 
Shapley and Shubik (1969). 
R e s t r i c t i o n  2 
Every coalition S is restricted to strategies for which E i e s X i  = 0. Essentially 
what this restriction requires is that although coalitions may rearrange levels 
of  actions among their members, they are not allowed to impose effects on 
non-members other than the effects imposed by the "zero" actions. This 
restriction is suggested by Starrett (1973). 
R e s t r i c t i o n  3 
Each coalition S is restricted to actions x i for i e S such that x + i Y s X i  R ]  x 
for all/" e ~S and all x e/ 'e  ~S xi" If  ff is a system of  Lindahl prices then all 
actions which comply with these restrictions will be ~-admissable for S. 
This result is due to Bergstrom (1975). An example of  a system of restric- 
tions of  this kind would be a society o f  agents living on a river and discharg- 
ing effluents as well as engaging in trade in ordinary private goods. If  the  
only "externalities" in the system are due to the downstream flow of  efflu- 
ents, then any coalition which excludes no one living downstream from its 
members can be left free to perform all exchanges and discharges which are 
technically feasible. In this case, a restriction of  type 3 is very simply articu- 




The condition 0 e Y, can be imposed without loss of generality just by translation. 
2. 
n 
The set × Yi is the cartesian product ~f the sets,Y1 . . . .  , Yn" 
i=1  
3. 
The X i is now the same as the Yi in Rader (1976) since the origin is specified. We can 
now use Y. for the traditional game notation. 
4. t 
n 
The setXX i is the set ~ x / x = Z x i where x i e X i for i = l , . . . , n ) .  
i=1 
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